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Glossary
Falastin – Palestine
Fallâhîn – rural peasants or villagers
Istiqlal – independence
Jihad – the act of struggling or striving; can refer to personal or public struggles
Kûfîya – a traditional headdress commonly worn by Arab peasants
Mujâhidîn – fighters engaged in guerrilla warfare
Nahda – a rebirth or renaissance
Tarbush – also called a fez; a felt or cloth brimless cap, usually red and with a silk tassel,
popularly worn by men during the Ottoman era
Wataniya – a sense of nationalism or patriotism
Yishuv – Hebraic term for the body of Jewish residents in Palestine prior to the establishment of
the State of Israel
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Introduction
In November of 1935, an impassioned preacher named Shaykh ‘Izz al-Dîn al-Qassâm
took to the hills in northern Palestine with the intention of raising a rebellion against the
government of the British Mandate, installed in Palestine since 1920. With the help of a few
followers, he engaged in a fierce fire fight against British police forces before being killed in
Ya’bad Forest on the 20th. While viewed as a terrorist by the British government, the enigmatic
shaykh had been a popular figure among Arab Palestinians. In exile from French Syria since the
early 1920s, he had proselytized among the working classes of Haifa, speaking out against a
British colonial project that he viewed as too favorable to Zionists.1 His death electrified a
Palestinian populace primed for rebellion. Within a few months, Palestinians launched a national
strike and boycott that erupted into a full-scale armed revolt by the end of 1936.
The different ways in which al-Qassâm was portrayed by Palestinians, British colonial
officials, and Zionists parallels the competing interpretations of the rebellion that followed him.
The British were quick to condemn the rebel as an extremist whose actions had imperiled law
and order in Mandatory Palestine. Government records and newspapers referred to “Qassâmite”
groups that were engaging in clandestine attacks on colonial officials and Zionist areas.
Commenting on the significance of al-Qassâm’s death, the Yishuv leader Moishe Beilinson
remarked that not “a gang of thieves but a body of political terrorists has lately confronted the
authorities in Palestine.”2 Zionists worried that the martyrdom of al-Qassâm by Arab Palestinians
would lead to a rebellion that could dismantle their hard-fought gains in Palestine. These gains

1

Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Fayettesville:
The University of Arkansas Press, 2003), 2.
2
Moishe Beilinson, as quoted in Shai Lachman, “Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine 1929–39: The Case of
Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Movement,” in Matthew Kraig Kelly, “Crime in the Mandate” (PhD diss.,
UCLA, 2013), 100.
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had begun with the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain declared that it viewed “with
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.”3 This document had established a
close relationship between the British government and the Zionist movement, which now sought
to limit the dangers wrought by al-Qassâm’s actions. For Arabs, al-Qassâm’s death became a
defining moment in the development of Palestinian nationalism. Palestinians rallied around him
as a figure of patriotic sacrifice who had willingly taken up arms against a repressive British
colonial government. His gravesite at Haifa emerged as a popular place of pilgrimage for
villagers and townspeople who wished to honor their fallen hero.4 This populist embrace of alQassâm contradicted a British and Zionist narrative that cast him as a violent extremist.
As the Arab Revolt unfolded in late 1936, differences in the representation of the conflict
only became more pronounced. The British were quick to paint the uprising as a series of violent
criminal attacks that threatened to sow chaos across Palestine. While colonial officials were
struggling with how to suppress the rebellion, The Egyptian Gazette, a British-controlled
newspaper in Cairo, published information pertaining to attacks on Jewish civilians and British
police forces.5 These reports often came from The Palestine Post, a leading Zionist newspaper in
Palestine that had a vested interest in highlighting violence committed against Jewish civilians.
Hoping to arouse international sympathy for the Zionist cause, the Post argued that the violence
of the Revolt was the product of Palestinian extremists with whom negotiation was impossible.
This characterization extended to Arab political leaders who resisted British colonial policy.
Falastin, the most prominent Palestinian newspaper, refuted these portrayals of the Revolt. In an

3

“Balfour Declaration: Text of the Declaration,” Jewish Virtual Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise,
accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/balfour.html.
4
Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 7.
5
The Egyptian Gazette, January 1, 1937.
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article from its June 19, 1936 issue, it described how the primary reason for “the eruption of the
current Arab revolution…is fear…Arabs were hoping Jewish migration would stop, but hopes
died…and now they fear national conflict.”6 Falastin’s editors hoped to give voice to a
Palestinian population that was resisting encroachment upon their land. This sympathetic
interpretation of the Revolt contrasted sharply with British and Zionist accounts that stressed its
criminal, violent nature.
Coming on the heels of a boycott in spring against Jewish and British goods, the 1936
rebellion gathered strength in the countryside as peasants took up arms. Bands of villagers
collectively undertook guerrilla attacks against British forces patrolling the eastern and northern
areas of Palestine. Using their intimate knowledge of the local landscape, rebels attacked British
patrols and then disappeared into the mountains. Their ability to transform quickly from fighters
into farmers frustrated British efforts to unmask the guerrillas.7 The British responded with an
escalation of home raids that had already begun in early 1936. The raids increased in urgency
and severity as the Mandatory government saw its power weakened in western Palestine.8 The
government communicated its alarm in newspapers throughout the region. The January 4, 1937
issue of The Egyptian Gazette announced that British authorities were offering £50,000 for
information related to “71 murders of British constables, soldiers, Jews and Arabs between
August and October last year.”9 The high reward reflected the government’s desire to quell the
rising tide of violence that was sweeping the country.

6

“The Land of Peace,” Falastin, June 19, 1936,
http://awraq.birzeit.edu/sites/default/files/19%20June%201936%20checked.pdf.
7
Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 126.
8
Matthew Kraig Kelly, “The Revolt of 1936: A Revision,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 44, No. 2 (2015): 34.
9
The Egyptian Gazette, January 4, 1937.
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Despite the efforts of the British, the rebellion gained strength in late 1937. Some of its
strength came from the support of Arabs in other countries. Supplemented by an influx of arms
and commanders from Syria and Transjordan, the rural mujâhidîn made inroads in central
Palestine. Jaffa and Beersheba briefly fell into rebel hands, and Palestinian commanders began
instituting alternative state apparatuses meant as a rebuke against British colonial policy.10
Rebels achieved their most tangible gain in 1938 with the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem.
Long revered as a holy site by Muslims, the triumph added religious significance to the
independence struggle. Urban elites in Palestine as well as Syria and Iraq reinforced these gains
with financial and political support.11 For a brief moment in early 1938, the rebellion seemed
capable of forcing the British to cede independence to the Palestinians.
An enormous British offensive against the Palestinian rebels hindered national unity and
led to the downfall of the Revolt. Despite a commission headed by Sir John Woodhead
concluding in November 1938 that the British plan for partition was unfeasible, the Mandatory
government brought in military reinforcements to crush the rebellion. The British replaced
civilian administrators with military commanders, who promptly used tanks and a huge amount
of soldiers to overwhelm the Palestinians. Walid Khalidi reports that fifty-five “Palestinians were
executed by hanging, at least twelve hundred Palestinians were killed in action by the British,
more than twice as many Palestinians were detained as in the previous year (1938).”12 The
military offensive proved too much for the rebels to handle and was accompanied by an
unraveling of national unity. Wealthy urbanites lost faith in a rebellion that they deemed

10

Sonia Fathi El-Nimr, “The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine: A Study Based on Oral Sources” (PhD diss.,
University of Exeter, 1990), 166-167.
11
Walid Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948 (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010), 190.
12
Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora, 190.
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threatening to their interests, and rival political families jockeyed for influence in what would
continue to be a British colony.13 British military power defeated the Revolt and disrupted the
cause of Palestinian nationalism.
Because of the British military victory, British and Zionist characterizations evolved into
the hegemonic historical narrative of the rebellion. Instead of contributing to the historiography,
popular Arab Palestinian memories were rarely translated for British and American readers.
Western historians glossed over discussions of economic dislocation and landlessness as drivers
of revolt in favor of illustrating the Palestinians as irrational actors. While Zionist historiography
intimately captured Jewish politics and diplomatic decision-making in the 1930s, it tended to
treat defiant Palestinians as extremists. Only recently has scholarship closely examining the
motivations and tactics of Palestinian actors reached English-speaking audiences. My thesis
aligns with this new trend in historical scholarship. It challenges representations of the Revolt as
an outburst of extremism and argues that it was a multifaceted struggle for unity.
The Egyptian Gazette and The Palestine Post presented one-sided depictions of the
Revolt that would inform future historiography on the conflict. The January 1, 1937 issue of The
Egyptian Gazette described an attack on a British military trolley traveling between Tulkarm and
Kalkilieh. After being attacked, the military responded by engaging with the rebels.14 While they
may have been accurate, reports like this one neglected to recognize the structural violence
imposed by the British Mandate that was fueling the attacks by Palestinians. As early as 1920,
the government established police forces that regularly patrolled the Palestinian countryside.
Raids on Palestinian villages began within weeks of the 1936 strike and only grew more severe

13
14

Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 85-86.
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as the armed revolt progressed.15 While The Egyptian Gazette did report on the harsh criminal
sentences imposed on Palestinians, it relied heavily on British Mandatory sources. Its reporting
methods resulted in journalism that lacked Palestinian perspectives on the deteriorating situation.
The Palestine Post suffered from similar problems as The Egyptian Gazette. As the
leading Zionist newspaper in Palestine, it carefully reported on the worsening plight of Jews in
Nazi Germany and highlighted the violence against Jews that did occur at the hands of Arab
Palestinians. Yet its belief in the beneficial impacts of a Jewish state in Palestine often caused the
newspaper to appear incredulous at Palestinians who refused to cooperate with British
authorities. The Post frequently reported on the workings of the Arab Higher Committee, a
coalition of prominent Palestinian political figures. While reporting on the Committee’s
deliberations over whether to appear before a Royal Commission in 1937, it described how “the
majority of Committee members, with the notable exception of the president, Haj Amin el
Husseini…were in favour of cooperation.”16 This portrait of Hajj Amin al-Husaynî, the political
leader of the Revolt, as an outlier obscures the strong support that he held among Palestinian
nationalists. It demonstrated the Post’s method of turning vocal opponents of British colonial
policy into unreasonable actors.
Much of the Zionist scholarship continued these newspapers’ trends of painting
Palestinian nationalists as extremists. Writing in 1993, Israeli historian Zvi Elpeleg marginalized
‘Izz al-Din al-Qassâm and his followers as radical and violent actors. “From the beginning of the
1930s, the Qassamites and other armed gangs carried out a series of violent operations in various

15

Kelly, “Revolt,” 34.
“Arab Higher Committee Deadlocked Again,” The Palestine Post, January 4, 1937,
http://www.jpress.nli.org.il/Olive/APA/NLI/?action=search&text=The%20Palestine%20Post#panel=document.
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parts of the country,” writes Elpeleg in his description of the actions of al-Qassâm’s followers.17
The lumping of these Palestinians under the moniker of “armed gangs” denigrates the
burgeoning national movement, which was responding to what Elpeleg himself describes as the
rapid land acquisition by Zionists in the 1930s. Since many Palestinian peasants lived on the land
of large Arab landowners, they would often be dispossessed by these purchases.18 The added
presence of British police patrols created a climate of fear that drove Palestinians to see armed
rebellion as their only possible means of resistance. Monty Noam Penkower relies on the same
language as Elpeleg to describe Palestinians like al-Qassâm. He describes how “Jewish Agency
sources heard that a few Qassâm gang leaders…had planned the killing” of Galilee District
Commissioner Lewis Andrews, an ally of Zionist expansion, on September 26, 1937.19 This
portrait of isolated gang leaders working against the British government ignores the popular
uprising that was occurring in eastern Palestine. Zionist scholarship tended to marginalize a
national rebellion that was growing in the mid-1930s.
Recent scholarship has begun to provide a more holistic view of the Arab Revolt.
Sherene Seikaly demonstrates how Arabs suffered in an economic arena that was skewed in
favor of Zionists. Article 11 of the British Mandate allowed for cooperation with the Jewish
Agency to develop public utilities and natural resources in Palestine. Colonial officials cited this
article when they “granted three major monopoly concessions to Zionist interests in the 1920s:
the electricity concession to the Palestine Electricity Corporation Limited (established in 1923),
the Dead Sea salt concessions to the Palestine Potash Company (established in 1929), and the

17

Zvi Elepeleg, The Grand Mufti: Hajj Amin Al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (Oxford,
United Kingdom: Routledge, 1993), 37.
18
Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti, 36.
19
Monty Noam Penkower, Palestine in Turmoil: The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1933-1939 (Vol. II) (New York:
Touro College Press, 2014), 435.

Brown 11
salt concession in 1922 to the Palestine Salt Company,” writes Seikaly.20 These concessions
would greatly benefit the growth of Zionist industry, as Jewish industrialists now had access to
valuable resources in Palestine. Yet the Jewish economy did not exist in a vacuum, and Seikaly
demonstrates the important contributions that Arab workers and businessmen made to the
regional economy. “By 1927, there were 3,505 industrial establishments in Palestine. By 1935,
Arab capital investment was mostly in tobacco, cardboard, soap, and milling factories, and a
growing textile industry, but Arabs also made industrial advances in metals, chemicals, leather,
beverages, and quarrying.”21 Seikaly attributes the variance of industry to a new middle class of
merchants that were particularly active in the coastal cities of Gaza, Jaffa, and Haifa. These
businessmen existed alongside Jewish merchants but did not enjoy the same subsidies and
concessions offered by the Mandatory government. Palestinians experienced fewer opportunities
for economic growth because of the preferential treatment provided to Zionists by the Mandate.
Matthew Kelly describes how the rebellion also responded to British repression that was
more severe than is usually recognized. While scholars have traditionally argued that British
measures were restrained from April through October of 1936, Kelly illustrates how “the British
adopted harsh repressive measures within weeks of the declaration of an Arab strike in April
1936, and they continued to employ them for months afterward.”22 These measures took the form
of raids on Palestinian villages and the destruction of volatile neighborhoods in Jaffa and Haifa
in the name of urban renewal.23 Rashid Khalidi expands on the brutal actions of the British.
“Hundreds of homes were blown up (perhaps as many as two thousand), crops were destroyed,

20

Sherene Seikaly, Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2015), 7.
21
Seikaly, 14.
22
Kelly, “Revolt,” 28.
23
Ibid., 34.
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and over one hundred rebels were summarily executed simply for the possession of firearms, or
even ammunition,” writes Khalidi, demonstrating the heavy-handed response to the Revolt in
1937-39.24 By late 1939, over 10 percent of the adult male population was killed, wounded,
imprisoned, or in exile.25 Kelly and Khalidi demonstrate the structural violence imposed by the
British both before and during the Revolt.
Through oral interviews conducted in the West Bank in the 1980s, Ted Swedenburg
reveals how representations of the Revolt differed among Palestinians involved in it. He argues
that the rebellion was primarily a lower class movement that forced urban elites to act more
decisively against British colonialism and Zionist expansion. By prioritizing rural voices, he also
reveals tensions between classes that continue to plague Palestinian nationalism to this day.
Muhammad Kîlanî, an elderly veteran of the Revolt, bemoaned that the rebellion “would have
succeeded if wealthy Palestinians had only sacrificed for it one-tenth as much as poor people
did.”26 Memories like these were often accompanied by complaints that prominent political
families like the Husaynîs and the Nashâshîbîs were insufficiently aggressive against the British.
Wealthy Palestinians usually responded with claims that they sacrificed much of their fortunes in
order to support the rebellion. Aside from class differences, Swedenburg also delves into the
unpopular memories of collaboration with the British that complicate the official nationalist
narrative of complete unity.27 Evidence of collaboration demonstrates the difficulties that
Palestinians faced in maintaining unity in the later stages of the rebellion.

24

Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006),
107.
25
Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 108.
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Muhammad Kîlanî as qtd. in Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 28.
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Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 108-112.
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The representations of the Revolt by ‘Issa al-‘Issa, the editor of Falastin, further
complicate the notion of Palestinian nationalism. In a book containing ‘Issa al-‘Issa’s memoirs,
Noha Tadros Khalaf delineates how the Jaffa-born newspaper editor was an early champion of
Palestinian rights. While using his newspaper as a platform for Palestinian voices, he became
active politically as one of the thirty-three founding members of the Arab Higher Committee.28
But a falling-out with Hajj Amin al-Husaynî led al-‘Issa to become increasingly critical of the
leader’s decisions. Although initially supportive of the Revolt, he later remembered it as
devolving into chaos that turned Palestinians against one another. “All those who had grievances
profited from the situation to take vengeance on their enemies in the name of the revolution to
the point that the whole country was enveloped by confusion and distress,” he wrote in the late
1940s from Lebanon, to which he had fled in 1937.29 His opinion of the Revolt changed as he
saw himself and others targeted for their supposed lack of commitment to the revolutionary
cause. While al-‘Issa remained nationalist, his critical view of the rebellion exposed the
competing interpretations of the conflict among Palestinians.
In order to demonstrate the contested nature of the Revolt, I have focused my thesis on
how each side represented the conflict, both in popular media and official discourse. This
approach yields a sociopolitical history of the rebellion that I believe is more useful than one
prioritizing its military aspects. While British and Zionist authorities portrayed the Revolt as an
outburst of crime, I argue that Palestinians acted in a myriad of ways in their attempt to achieve
independence.

28

Noha Tadros Khalaf, Les Mémoires de ‘Issa al-‘Issa: Journaliste et intellectuel palestinien (1878-1950) (Paris:
Éditions Karthala, 2009), 27.
29
‘Issa al-‘Issa, as qtd. in Khalaf, ‘Issa al-‘Issa, 226.
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Chapter One explores the goals and tactics of the lower classes during the Revolt. It
provides an overview of the rebellion’s progression while highlighting the tensions that arose
between rural rebels and urban elites as elites found their privileges threatened. Chapter Two
uses ‘Issa al-‘Issa as a case study of upper class representations of the Revolt. I argue that while
supporting the Revolt wholeheartedly in Falastin, al-‘Issa grew personally disillusioned because
of the demands placed on him by rebels. His memoir demonstrates that upper class
characterizations could differ widely from those of the lower classes. In Chapter Three, I
transition into British and Zionist characterizations of the rebellion. Newspapers and official
records demonstrate how the British government and Zionist authorities used the language of
criminology to describe the Revolt. The Revolt’s defeat cemented this language as the
hegemonic narrative surrounding the rebellion. In my conclusion, I align my work with newer
historiography that challenges pre-existing narratives in order to reveal the complexities behind
Palestinian actions during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.
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Chapter One
“All Must Wear the Kûfîya:” Palestinian Tensions during the Arab Revolt
On August 26, 1938, at the height of the Revolt, the rebel leadership commanded all
Palestinian townsmen to discard the Ottoman tarbush in favor of the kûfîya, the traditional rural
headdress. According to rebel headquarters in Damascus, this move was adopted to “demonstrate
the complete solidarity of the residents of the country with the struggle, and as a sign that
everyone in the country is a rebel.”30 While promoted as creating a national symbol that would
also help fighters blend into urban areas, the order exposed the tensions between a newly
empowered rural peasantry and an urban upper class. Because many upper class notables
preferred the tarbush, mandating the kûfîya represented a symbolic inversion of traditional
hierarchies through the medium of clothing. Many urbanites were reluctant to abandon an article
of clothing that they associated with modernity. The prominent Nashashîbî family continued to
wear the tarbush as a statement of opposition against the Revolt, with the political leader Fakhrî
Nashashîbî claiming that there “is no national significance in [the kûfîya] at all.”31 The kûfîya
issue encapsulated the larger regional and class tensions that were disrupting the unity of the
Revolt.
While the rebellion began as a unified national movement, it developed tensions over the
course of three years that hampered its effectiveness. Nearly all Palestinians adhered to the
national boycott and strike that started in spring 1936 and supported the armed uprising that
occurred simultaneously in the countryside. While rural peasants did most of the fighting,
wealthy urbanites lent much needed financial support to the cause. Yet the rebels’ gains in 193738 and the consequent disruption of traditional hierarchies caused tensions to emerge along

30
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regional and class lines. As rural rebels made surprising inroads into towns like Jerusalem and
Tulkarm, urban elites found their influence threatened. Fearing the loss of traditional class
privileges, many formerly sympathetic businessmen and political leaders turned against the
Revolt. While the British military inflicted losses on the rebels in 1938-39, upper class notables
gradually withdrew financial and political support.32 Palestinian national unity lay in disarray by
the Revolt’s conclusion.
Palestinian society preceding the rebellion was characterized by stark socioeconomic
inequality. By 1936 the population had reached 1,336,578, up from 752,048 in 1922. The
majority of Palestinians still lived in the countryside of northern and central Palestine as opposed
to the coastal cities of Jaffa and Haifa. However, the late Ottoman era saw a shift in control “over
local administration and tax collection from rural Shaykhs to an emerging class of urban
notables,” writes Sonia El-Nimr.33 Land laws allowed urban notables and a rising commercial
bourgeoisie to acquire vast amounts of land, and many peasants became share-croppers for these
large landowners, both local and absentee. Urban elites thus assumed an increasing degree of
control over the lives of rural residents, even as the two sectors of society usually lived far apart
from one another.34 Social and political power was rooted in families, and no two families were
more powerful than the Husaynîs and Nashâshîbîs. Aside from being extraordinarily wealthy,
these two clans held administrative positions during the British Mandate that were often
inherited from the Ottoman era. They competed bitterly for political influence both in the lead-up
to and throughout the Revolt.35 The regional, class, and familial differences characterizing 1930s
Palestine revealed a country that would face enormous difficulties in sustaining national unity.

32

Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 34.
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Palestinian actions during the Revolt varied according to region and class. The failed
uprising of Shaykh al-Qassâm in 1935 ignited a general strike and armed revolt that spread
across the countryside and dismantled the British hold on Palestine. While nominally headed by
a wealthy urban leadership, the rural peasantry emerged as the main force behind the Revolt.
Mujâhidîn spearheaded guerrilla attacks on British security forces that resulted in the Palestinian
takeover of key cities by late 1937.36 Emboldened by their success, these rural fighters
envisioned an independent Palestine that would be free of both British imperialism and Zionist
expansion. Despite these achievements, urban elites felt threatened by the rebels’ quick gains and
incursions into towns like Jerusalem and Nablus. While the upper class leaders desired an
independent Palestine, they hoped for one that would maintain class hierarchies.37 The rapid
changes caused by the national movement led some to collaborate with a British military that had
regained its footing by the middle of that year. The divergent visions of post-colonial Palestine
hindered national unity in the later stages of the Revolt.
Al-Qassâm’s actions preceding the rebellion led to him being viewed as a martyr for the
Palestinian national cause. Arriving in the coastal city of Haifa in 1921, al-Qassâm emerged as
both a popular Islamic preacher who proselytized among the lower classes and a political activist
responsible for founding a branch of the Young Men’s Muslim Association. Convinced of the
need for militancy against the British, he became involved with clandestine armed groups
responsible for several attacks during the early 1930s. While al-Qassâm’s own uprising in
Ya‘bad Forest in 1935 was quickly crushed by the British and led to his death, it sealed his
reputation as a national hero for Palestinians. As Matthew Kelly explains, rural Palestinians were

36
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elated that someone “was finally fighting the British.”38 His actions inspired Palestinians who
were exasperated with the slow, non-confrontational approach practiced by traditional leaders up
until this point. While no tombstone was erected at his place of death in northern Palestine,
Palestinians built a memorial to al-Qassâm in Haifa. “The mausoleum quickly became a popular
site of pilgrimage for Palestinians, who regarded Qassâm as a kind of national saint,” writes Ted
Swedenburg.39 Al-Qassâm’s willingness to die for the national cause electrified Palestinians and
proved a catalyst for the general strike of 1936 and the ensuing armed revolt.
These rural Palestinians who were inspired by al-Qassâm’s example executed
decentralized, grassroots-organized attacks on British forces in the beginning of the Revolt.
Many villagers remembered the rebellion as one of spontaneous guerrilla warfare. Veterans
“related that the men in their hamlets set up bands spontaneously, in response to the general
atmosphere of insurgency, rather than at the suggestion or order of rebel commanders,” explains
Swedenburg, revealing the rural beginnings of the rebellion.40 Many youth groups expressed
their support for the actions of their rural countrymen. The June 19, 1936 issue of Falastin
published a letter from a student committee in Tulkarm to the fighters and exiles, which stated:
“The Arab Student Committee of Tulkarm salutes you and your manhood, friendship, and
sacrifice on the path of God and motherland,” thereby displaying the nationalist fervor that had
taken hold of the country.41 The peasants undertook armed ambushes against British patrols in
1936 and, after a pause following the end of the strike, again in late 1937. Villagers had a strong
understanding of the mountainous areas and were often able to evade British countermeasures.
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One British colonial report from 1936 lamented that “British soldiers are no match in the hills for
lightly clad natives who…can drop their weapons pro tem and become peaceful ploughmen and
goatherds until the military have passed by.”42 These decentralized actions frustrated British
efforts to quell the Revolt in the countryside.
While much of the initial uprising was organized in rural areas, the central command
played a large role in recruitment and gradually increased its supervision of the Revolt. The Arab
Higher Committee in Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1936 sent commanders into rural areas to collect
arms and recruit men. While many of these commanders were Palestinian, some came from
places like Damascus and Beirut to lead the Revolt. These commanders demanded that peasants
contribute men and arms to the uprising. They were usually met with acceptance by villagers
who were more than eager to inflict blows on the British. As the rebellion continued, the central
command increased its coordination with local initiatives.43 However, the exile of many of the
political heads of the Revolt in 1936-37 left a gap in domestic leadership. This gap was filled by
fighters from Syria and Lebanon who quickly assumed positions of command within the Revolt.
Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Syrian officer in the Iraqi army, established himself as a leading commander
in Palestine. In his Second Communique as chief rebel commander, he announced the formation
of a court that intended to “maintain security and order in the country, and to put an end to
treachery, collaboration, and corruption.”44 These courts attempted to reinforce the rebels’ gains
against the British and preserve national unity. Al-Qawuqji led several battles against the British
before leaving Palestine after the Arab Higher Committee called off the strike. The “first
successful attempt to organize the rebels in a hierarchical structure under one leadership came
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from al-Qawuqji,” explains Sonia El-Nimr, demonstrating how these experienced soldiers
enhanced the rebellion’s organization.45 The mixture of outside fighters and central command
helped the Revolt move past its rural beginnings.
As the rebellion progressed, tensions emerged as rural fighters demanded more from
wealthier urbanites. Villagers’ varied memories about these tensions differed from an elite
nationalist narrative that tended to romanticize the fallâhîn and gloss over any evidence of
disunity. Certain villagers bemoaned the seeming lack of effort among urban notables who
would contribute financially but not partake in the fighting themselves. “The leadership should
die before the people, not go into exile,” a former fighter complained in his characterization of
the exile of elites to Lebanon and Syria as a cowardly act that left the population unprotected.46
As the British forces retook key cities in 1938-39, the criticisms by rural fighters grew more
intense, and many condemned urban elites that they deemed traitors to the national cause. Some
mujâhidîn assassinated fellow countrymen. The ensuing chaos alienated wealthier supporters
who had been initially supportive of the Revolt. Swedenburg quotes Abû Ja‘far, a wealthy
urbanite and former patron of the rebellion, as saying, “Our problem was that our [military]
leaders were ignorant. Fallâhîn. What was Abû Durra [a mujâhidîn]? A worker!”47 The upper
classes began to turn away from the Revolt and blame its chaotic nature on peasants’
vindictiveness and ignorance.
This sentiment exposed the fear among notables that the armed rebellion would upend
traditional class hierarchies, which they hoped to maintain in a post-colonial Palestine. In certain
areas, it did, as alternative state apparatuses appeared throughout the countryside in which newly
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appointed commanders, often young, lower class men, collected taxes and settled local disputes.
Swedenburg notes that “rebels even possessed a written code of laws and regulations,”
evidencing the new power structures meant to replace British colonialism.48 While these
structures were meant more as a rebuke against the British than the elites, the upper classes
feared that they would decrease their authority in the future. Exasperation grew among urban
elites when the order to don the kûfîya came in 1938. Many had no desire to replace the tarbush
with this “backward” piece of clothing.49 The increasing strength of rebel demands enhanced
tensions among Palestinians of different classes.
The ongoing rivalry between the Husaynî and Nashâshîbî families exacerbated problems
for the Revolt. Both families played important roles in the Ottoman administration and held
lasting influence during the British Mandate. Hajj Amin al-Husaynî, appointed head of the
Islamic Supreme Council in 1921 by the British, emerged as the political leader of the rebellion.
Initially a powerful figure in Palestine, his exile to Lebanon in 1937 hindered his ability to
control the Revolt. His family’s power and influence threatened that of the Nashashîbîs, the other
most prominent family in Jerusalem. The Nashashîbîs and their followers, deemed the
Opposition, advocated a more moderate stance toward the British and Zionists than did the
Husaynîs and soon began working against the rebel movement.50 “Peace bands” with
connections to the Nashashîbîs contributed to the British counterinsurgency with attacks on rebel
positions throughout Palestine. El-Nimr attributes the founding of these bands to Raghib alNashashîbî, the Head of the Opposition. She characterizes them as Raghib’s “own small war
against the Husaynî faction, and in particular the Mufti [Hajj Amin].”51 While small in number,
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these groups demonstrated the fierce competition fostered by the ambition of rival political
camps. The Husaynî-Nashashîbî rivalry developed into a problem for the Revolt as it appeared in
the countryside and hindered national unity.
Hajj Amin al-Husayn’s authority over the Revolt is disputed by historians. While
Swedenburg asserts that the leader’s importance to the rebellion diminished after his 1937 exile,
others position him as a leading player through 1939. Zvi Elpeleg, an Israeli historian writing in
the 1990s, argues that Hajj Amin directly controlled the Revolt from Lebanon. Once settled in
the town of Dhauq Mika’il, he organized the Central Committee of the Jihad, which oversaw
guerrilla attacks against British military installations and Zionist outposts. “All of this activity
was carried out in accordance with orders that the local commanders received directly from Hajj
Amin, by means of the central committee in Damascus,” writes Elpeleg.52 While Hajj Amin
certainly organized politically, Elpeleg may overstate his role as a military tactician. Few records
indicate how the Damascus committee communicated across the border with Palestinian rebels.
The rebels were sabotaging railroads and disrupting telegraph lines, while the British military
was patrolling the Palestine-Lebanon border.53 Communication between insurgents across
national boundaries became exceedingly difficult in 1937-38. Elpeleg’s portrait of Hajj Amin as
a capable military leader is odd given his earlier depiction of the man as removed from the
militancy of his countrymen. As late as 7 May 1936, Hajj Amin gave a speech before the Arab
Higher Committee that sought assistance from Arabs for the national cause. “Although the
address was characterized by anti-Jewish incitement, there was also a marked effort to prevent
further confrontation with the British,” explains Elpeleg.54 While the leader privately supported
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the military cause, he seems to have delegated the responsibility of organizing guerrilla attacks to
others. Elpeleg overstates the importance of Hajj Amin’s military leadership to the Revolt post1937.
Rural Palestinians countered claims of backwardness directed against them by pointing to
the rivalries of the Husaynîs and Nashashîbîs as a factor in the downfall of the Revolt. In the
years following the rebellion, they claimed that these leaders used the movement for their own
ends, even going so far as to assassinate political opponents. Reflecting on the Revolt in the
1980s, some villagers attacked Hajj Amin, al-Hâjj Ibrâhîm, the mayor of Tûlkarm, and
Oppositionist Sulaymân Tawqân, the mayor of Nablus “as being in cahoots with the British.”55
Swedenburg notes that some of his interviewees portrayed rebel commanders as trying to
transcend rivalries by appealing to villagers’ watanîya, or sense of nationalism. While some
commanders may have acted in such a way, the breakdown of unity in 1938-39 complicates this
narrative. Many rebel leaders targeted suspected traitors to the Palestinian national movement,
whether they were wealthy urbanites or rural peasants. Punishments for collaborators included
“putting the person in a dry well for the duration of his sentence, or keeping him in a locked
room provided by the village,” explains El-Nimr.56 Rebel leaders instituted punishments for
detractors that they hoped would quell dissent. The actions of Palestinians during the Revolt
demonstrate that rivalries and dissension existed in both urban and rural areas.
Tensions across regional and class lines hurt the ability of Palestinians to maintain
national unity in the face of British military superiority. Initially inspired by the fierce uprising of
al-Qassâm, rural residents undertook decentralized attacks against British security forces. The
guerrilla warfare proved effective, especially in the northern mountains where villagers had a
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greater knowledge of the terrain. These attacks were complemented by a central command
operating in Jerusalem and Jaffa and an influx of outside fighters from the greater Levant. As the
rebels made surprising gains, regional and class tensions began to become more pronounced. The
strength of the rebel movement and its subversion of hierarchies startled wealthy urbanites who
found their influence threatened. The placement of young rebel commanders into positions of
power and the increasing demands for support alienated upper class residents who preferred a
moderate approach toward the British. While nationalist in spirit, families like the Husaynîs and
Nashashîbîs wanted a Palestinian state that allowed them to keep their wealth and political
influence. These goals were increasingly imperiled by the rural movement. Although initially
successful, the rural rebellion quickly revealed tensions in the face of British force and elite
pushback.
‘Issa al-‘Issa was one of these elites who would turn against the Revolt. While his
newspaper Falastin emerged as a strong nationalist voice for Palestinians in the 1920s and 30s,
he grew increasingly doubtful about the viability of the national movement under the leadership
of Hajj Amin. His political alliances drew the ire of the rebels, and he was forced to flee from
Palestine in 1937.57 Al-‘Issa’s disillusionment with the Revolt reflected the experiences of many
initially supportive wealthy urbanites. In the next chapter, I use his story as a case study of upper
class representations of the rebellion.
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Chapter Two
“Chaos reigned…:” ‘Issa al-‘Issa’s Rupture with the Revolt
Writing from Lebanon in the late 1940s, a few years before his death, ‘Issa al-‘Issa had
few kind words to say about the Revolt. “While the revolution had at first been directed against
the English and the Jews, it transformed later into civil war; more Arabs died by Arab arms than
by those of British or Jews. Chaos reigned and the fleeing and the pillages became a regular
thing.”58 His statement regarding the source of Arab deaths was inaccurate; the vast majority of
Palestinian fatalities came at the hands of the British.59 Al-‘Issa’s inaccuracy reflected his
resentment toward the way in which the rebellion devolved. Remembering the Revolt that
eventually forced him to flee his homeland was painful for the elderly man. While initially
supportive of the revolution, he perceived it as devolving into chaos quickly in 1937. Al-‘Issa
had been a strong proponent of Palestinian nationalism and political rights in his newspaper
Falastin, which operated throughout the 20s and 30s. What caused this committed nationalist to
later mourn over a Revolt that he arguably helped to bring about? How does his understanding of
the rebellion disrupt narratives that stressed its total unity?
Answers to these questions lie in a thorough examination of his career as a newspaper
editor and political figure in Palestine. He founded Falastin in Jaffa in 1911 and built the
newspaper into the most popular Arabic-language news publication in Palestine by the late 20s.
While the newspaper was initially focused on local issues, al-‘Issa developed a national
reputation for the journal by covering British Mandatory policies and political events in
surrounding Arab countries. Never one to shy away from controversial topics, he repeatedly
antagonized colonial officials by publishing anti-Zionist editorials and pressing for Palestinian
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political representation.60 Al-‘Issa did not limit himself to the journalistic arena and became a
founding member of several political parties and committees in the 20s and 30s that advocated
for Palestinian self-determination. He saw himself as a developer of Palestinian nationalism,
which he viewed as necessary to combat a British colonial project that was depriving
Palestinians of their natural rights. Yet political rivalries led him to become increasingly critical
of the national movement’s leadership, even as he used Falastin to defend Palestinians’ right to
armed rebellion against the British.61 While al-‘Issa was careful to publicly support the rebellion,
his memoir from the late 1940s depicts a man increasingly threatened by vengeful and
opportunistic rebels. His decision to flee in 1937 or 1938 (historical records differ) after being
individually targeted represented his final rupture with the Revolt. ‘Issa al-‘Issa emerged as a
conflicted nationalist who fell victim to a rebellion that spread beyond his control.
Al-‘Issa’s characterization of the Revolt criticized the lower classes more so than did the
accounts put forth by rural mujâhidîn. His memoirs were an upper class counterpoint to the oral
histories of former rebels. While rebel accounts could differ, they tended to argue that the
rebellion failed because upper class urbanites withdrew support as the British military regrouped
in 1938. Both official and popular Palestinian narratives stressed the unity of the Revolt until this
point. Writing in the late 40s, al-‘Issa disputed this narrative, claiming that members of his own
political party, al-‘Difa, “which didn’t participate in the revolution, were victims of crimes of
vengeance…certain people were assassinated” even before he was forced to flee in 1937 or
1938.62 His portrayal of the Revolt descending into chaos early on perhaps grew out of the
trauma of being personally targeted in an assassination plot. It also reflected the need to justify
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his alliance with the Nashashîbîs, who were vilified by most rebels following the Revolt because
of their connection with “peace bands” that fought against the mujâhidîn.63 By illustrating the
Revolt as a civil war between Palestinians, al-‘Issa could portray himself as a moderate voice and
thereby justify his ties with the Nashashîbîs. The newspaper editor attempted to contrast his
reasonableness and foresight with the reckless leadership of Hajj Amin. His memoirs reflect a
man who was still negotiating his relationship to the Palestinian national movement.
Despite his later foray into partisan politics, al-‘Issa began his career as a journalist. Born
into an upper class Christian family in Jaffa in 1878, he managed to gain admittance to an
American university at the turn of the century. “My penchant for journalism perhaps came earlier
than when I founded Falastin in 1911, but when I was studying at an American university in
1897 and started publishing Les Élites with my friend,” al-‘Issa wrote in his memoir, revealing
his early entrepreneurial spirit.64 Falastin began as a twice weekly journal devoted to issues in
the Arab Christian Orthodox community but quickly turned its attention to political topics as
well. It increased its readership as it began to address the status of the Palestinian peasantry,
which was suffering from the decimation of an Ottoman cotton industry that was being
outcompeted by its European rivals. Many fallâhîn were forced to work on the estates of large
landowners, where they assumed large debts and experienced intensive taxation.65 Al-‘Issa’s
newfound political focus unnerved the Ottoman government, which banned Falastin in 1915. Al‘Issa spent the war years exiled from Palestine and returned to Jaffa in 1920 determined to
republish his newspaper under what was now British colonial rule.66 His commitment to tackling
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serious political issues in Falastin regardless of the political climate prepared him for an icy
relationship with the Mandatory government and an emerging Zionist movement.
Al-‘Issa envisioned Falastin as a forum for Palestinian nationalism at a time when the
possibility of self-determination was increasingly under attack. Historian Tarif Khalidi argues
that urban professionals and intellectuals “manifested a passion for the Palestinian cause, and a
general tone of anguish, revolt, rancor, resistance and death dominated the cultural domain”
during the British Mandate.67 Al-‘Issa hoped to respond to this climate with a publication that
would build unity among Palestinians for self-determination. While writing many editorials
himself, he also allowed various journalists to reflect on the state of Palestinian politics under the
Mandate. Falastin became a civic platform in which ideas about Palestinian statehood could be
formulated and discussed. In her introduction to his memoir, Noha Tadros Khalaf writes that al‘Issa intended the journal to be both “a reflection on the aspirations of the nation and a tool of
information, debate, and knowledge.”68 While Falastin stressed the need of Palestinians to unify,
it also voiced concerns over the tactics of various political parties. In a May 1934 editorial,
Falastin criticized the recently-formed al-Istiqlal party for being insufficiently action-oriented.
“This manner of operation is no different than the path of speeches that enter one ear and leave
through the other, or telegrams transmitted along unending radio waves…[it] has nothing to do
with the real jihad,” explained the editorial, revealing its exasperation over al-Istiqlal’s breezy
idealism.69 Al-‘Issa’s own association with that party’s founding in 1932 demonstrated that he
entertained opposing viewpoints in his journal. He viewed informed debate as a way to facilitate
Palestinian nation-building.

67

Tarif Khalidi, as qtd. in Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 45.
69
Falastin, as quoted in Mustafa Kabha, The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929-1939: Writing Up
a Storm (Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007), 75.
68

Brown 29
Al-‘Issa’s willingness to confront the Mandatory government and political Zionism
earned him the rancor of British colonial officials. Upon his postwar return to Jaffa, he was
initially denied the right to resume publication of his newspaper by the British High
Commissioner. After Colonel Stirling, an intermediate official, intervened on his behalf, he
received permission and began republishing Falastin on March 6, 1921.70 Al-‘Issa devoted the
first few issues to discussing the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which lent British support to the
creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. His critiques of colonial policy upset Stirling,
and al-‘Issa’s memoirs recall a testy conversation between the two men shortly after Falastin had
resumed publication:
Al-‘Issa: I adopted these politics before the Balfour Declaration, and it is impossible
for me not to continue with the same political voice…so permit me to fulfill my
national work while you fulfill the obligations of your job.
Stirling: You don’t know that your exile from Palestine was due to your campaigns
against Zionism and that it was the Zionists who opposed your return, so do not do
anything which could damage your situation.71
Stirling’s motives for incorporating Zionist leaders’ opinions into his argument are unclear.
While he may have personally feared for al-‘Issa’s safety, Stirling more likely was using all
arguments available in order to make al-‘Issa restrain the rhetoric of his paper. He also felt
personally affronted at what he deemed inflammatory content in Falastin after convincing the
High Commissioner to allow its republication. Al-‘Issa responded to Colonel Stirling’s warning
by drawing on the continuity of his politics. By dating his “national work” to before the Balfour
Declaration, he attempted to deflect arguments that Falastin was unfairly anti-Zionist. He viewed
the British sponsorship of political Zionism as only one of many obstacles to be overcome.
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In a bid to turn public opinion against Zionist expansion in Palestine, al-‘Issa
occasionally allowed opinions to be published in Falastin that appear naïve in hindsight. In an
editorial from the first Mandate-era issue, al-‘Issa wrote of Palestinian fears that “the Turks tried
to sell this earth as merchandise to the Zionists, in order to procure money that they desperately
needed” during WWI.72 There is little evidence to support this claim, which runs counter to the
Ottomans’ efforts to defend their sultanate from a British and Arab offensive during the war
years. As tensions rose in the late 1920s and early 30s, Falastin included a few editorials that
overemphasized factionalism within the Zionist movement. Palestinian journalists sensed an
opportunity with the rise of the Revisionist Zionist party led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in the 20s.
Jabotinsky advocated a more aggressive stance against Palestinians that challenged the moderate
approach of Chaim Weizmann, the political leader of the Zionist movement. Witnessing tensions
within Zionist politics, a Falastin editorial from March 3, 1931 claimed that “political Zionism is
dead. Weizmann himself was forced to admit this when he declared that Zionism had as a goal
the establishment of a communal (binational) State in Palestine, [and] the majority of Jews did
not share this opinion.”73 The author saw the rising influence of the Revisionist Zionists as
evidence that the British would be forced to renege on an alliance with the Zionist movement as
a whole. Yet the British responded to Jabotinsky by banning him from returning to Palestine
when he briefly left in the 30s, and the Zionist movement soldiered on. Certain editorials in
Falastin demonstrated obtuseness in their coverage of the Zionist movement.
Al-‘Issa supplemented his journalistic work with political activities as well. In his
memoir, he recalled his contribution to the formation of different political parties in the 20s and
30s. “Palestine became a place of revolts and disturbances. Many Arab Congresses were held,
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followed by executive Committees…under the presidency of Mûsâ Kâzim al-Husaynî. I was
always a member of these committees,” he wrote, demonstrating his inclusion in the political
formations of the time.74 Mûsâ Kâzim al-Husaynî was a patriarch of the al-Husaynî family and
headed the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) until 1934.75 Apart from providing a forum for
Palestinian voices, these committees negotiated with British colonial officials for increased
Palestinian political representation. They also sent delegations to Britain to advocate for the
Palestinian national cause. The first AHC emerged from an electoral vote of the third Arab
National Congress in 1920. Due to his inclusion in that first committee, Noha Tadros Khalaf
concludes that al-‘Issa “was one of the thirty-three members of what defined the first political
management team in Palestine.”76 Falastin’s prominence on the national scene combined with
al-‘Issa’s wealthy background earned him acceptance into this elite committee. This group set
the stage for a proliferation of political parties, one of the earliest of which was the al-Istiqlal
party, founded in 1932 by an acquaintance of al-‘Issa’s named Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza.77 Al‘Issa’s political actions showcased a man eager to provide leadership for the Palestinian national
cause.
Al-‘Issa experienced a falling out with Hajj Amin al-Husaynî that would make him more
critical of the national movement’s leadership. After Mûsâ Kâzim al-Husaynî’s death in 1934,
Al-‘Issa campaigned to have the late leader’s position filled by a member of the Nashashîbî
family. Initially neutral about Hajj Amin, al-‘Issa gradually developed a view of him as too
controlling and ambitious. “My relations with Haj Amin were good…but he started to meddle in
all affairs and tried to dominate the Higher Committee…which was criticized by Mûsâ Kâzim
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Pacha and all the other members…I started then to criticize certain actions and interventions of
his,” wrote al-‘Issa in his memoirs.78 Grappling with a way to justify his shift to an alliance with
the Nashashîbîs, al-‘Issa claimed that even members of Hajj Amin’s own family criticized him.
Al-‘Issa’s friendship with Ragheb Beyk al-Nashashîbî contributed to his dislike of Hajj Amin.
When Ragheb Beyk lost the Jerusalem mayoral elections in 1934 to Jamal Pacha al-Husaynî, a
relative of Hajj Amin, al-‘Issa pointed to the loss as evidence of Hajj Amin’s political
machinations. “A grand propaganda campaign occurred against [Ragheb Beyk], orchestrated by
Jamal Pacha al-Husaynî…with the support of Haj Amin…who saw in Ragheb Beyk a political
adversary,” wrote al-‘Issa, convinced that Hajj Amin’s ambition was driving him to unfairly
influence elections.79 Al-‘Issa’s final split with Hajj Amin came when the newly elected
president of the AHC collaborated to keep him from traveling to England with a delegation
representing Arab Palestinian interests. Because al-‘Issa intended to represent the al-‘Difa party,
which he helped found with Ragheb Beyk, Hajj Amin ordered a political partner of his, Alfred
Roque, to take al-‘Issa’s place. According to al-‘Issa, “they posed all sorts of obstacles
preventing my departing. Hajj Amin succeeded in replacing me with Alfred Roque. One can
imagine the future repercussions of such an incident.”80 The newspaper editor’s dramatic
language demonstrated how he felt personally slighted by this move. Al-‘Issa’s memoirs
characterize Hajj Amin as politically untrustworthy.
Despite reservations about Hajj Amin, al-‘Issa defended the Revolt as a legitimate
response to British oppression. Falastin covered instances of British police aggression against
Palestinians. In its June 19, 1936 issue, Falastin reported the inspection of an orange grove by
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policemen. “British and Jewish police came to Tulkarm, entered the grove near the bridge but
didn’t find anything. Then they started terrorizing the watchmen and workers until they were
forced to leave,” reported one article, displaying the disruption of working life caused by the
police presence.81 This coverage echoed that from other Arab newspapers across Palestine.
“Reports of such measures appeared contemporaneously in the Arab press, and included charges
of theft, the destruction of food, and ‘ill treatment’ of villagers,” writes Matthew Kelly.82
Falastin was similar to other Palestinian newspapers in describing instances of British police
brutality. Journalists sought to illustrate the climate of fear that they attributed to British colonial
policy. In his memoir, al-‘Issa highlighted the imprisonment of several Palestinian political
figures as evidence of colonial overreach. “After the decline in relations in 1933, the [British]
government sent al-Ustaz al-Muzzafar, Fakhri al-Nashashîbî, Jamal al-Husaynî and others to
prison in the south of Palestine… [and] didn’t release them until they promised not to participate
in public affairs.”83 This punishment proved a tall order for figures who had spent the majority of
their lives in the public sphere. Al-‘Issa used Falastin as a way to document British abuses of
power.
While publicly supportive of the Revolt, al-‘Issa privately regretted the divisions that
characterized its later stages. His late 1940s memoir depicted the increasing violence of late 1936
and 1937. Rumors of “revolution against the British spread across the country. Tensions rose
after many members of the Higher Committee were deported to the Seychelles,” al-‘Issa wrote.84
The exile of these five Committee members accompanied the outlawing of all Palestinian
political parties in late 1937. The British were responding to the assassination by Palestinians of
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a senior administrator in Nazareth in September of that year.85 As the Mandatory government
enhanced its pressure on the political leadership, Hajj Amin came under heightened surveillance.
Fearing for his personal safety, he fled in disguise from Jaffa to Beirut in October of 1937.86 The
exiles, both forced and self-imposed, of these traditional political figures left a gap in domestic
leadership for Palestinians. Khalaf argues that “the suspension of the Arab Higher Committee in
October 1937 had as a consequence the destruction of all responsible leadership in the
Palestinian Arab.”87 She asserts that the outlawing of the Committee paved the way for a
breakdown in political organization among Palestinians, as moderate parties like al-Difa‘ were
pushed aside in favor of more militant actors. Al-‘Issa’s post-World War II representation of the
rebellion seems to align with that of Khalaf. Apart from documenting the actions taken against
members of al-Difa‘, al-‘Issa bemoaned the pettiness of certain revolutionaries. “All those who
had grievances profited from the situation to take vengeance on their enemies in the name of the
revolution,” he wrote, evidencing his displeasure with what he perceived as a rising number of
personal attacks between Palestinians.88 This perception reflected al-‘Issa’s frustration with both
his and al-Difa‘’s declining influence.
Al-‘Issa’s final rupture with the Revolt came after being personally targeted. In his
memoirs, he highlighted the increasing pressure placed on him by the rebel movement. Upon
returning to Jaffa after a trip to Italy, his brother-in-law and nephew instructed him to begin
wearing the kûfîya. While al-‘Issa is unclear about the date of this interaction, the order by rebels
to don the kûfîya came on August 26, 1938, which suggests that al-‘Issa was in Jaffa until then.
He outlines the demands made of him and Falastin by militants.
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I learned after my return that revolutionaries often came to the journal, where we
gave them money, flour, clothes, and all sorts of taxes that they demanded from
us. I suffered greatly from the effects of these taxes after my return, and some of
them came to my house in Ramallah to squeeze out funds in the name of the
revolution.89
Al-‘Issa exhibited a lack of trust that these funds would be used properly, and he became
increasingly disillusioned with the tactics of mujâhidîn who found themselves in a position of
power in the cities. Shortly after these developments, his brother-in-law was killed by unknown
assailants while at work in Jaffa. Al-‘Issa’s personal endangerment reached its peak after
acquaintances discovered an assassination plot against him. Al-‘Issa at first appeared incredulous
at the threat. “Could this happen to someone like me, who is considered as one of the most loyal
men to the Palestinian cause and who helped form the nationalist spirit?” he asked, indicating his
disbelief that he would be treated as a traitor.90 Realizing that staying in Palestine was no longer
an option, he fled and eventually settled in Lebanon. Historians differ slightly on the exact date
of his escape but agree that he was no longer in Palestine on January 1, 1939.91 Concerned with
his legacy, al-‘Issa portrayed himself as devoted to the national cause even if his tactics differed
from those of rural rebels.
Al-‘Issa’s representation of the Revolt stemmed from a need to justify his moderation to
skeptical mujâhidîn. His close ties with the Nashashîbîs earned distrust from many peasants who
viewed the family as villains due to its role in sponsoring “peace bands” that fought against the
Revolt. Mustafa Kabha argues that during the rebellion, “the newspapers that expressed the
views of the urban notable families, headed by Falastin, were compelled to become more
flexible in their attitude towards the villagers.”92 These villagers overwhelmingly filled the ranks
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of the rebel movement and pressured upper class residents to make sacrifices for the rebellion.
Responding to these pressures and others from allies of Hajj Amin, Falastin maintained support
for the rebellion until its conclusion. In its August 14, 1938 issue, the newspaper declared that
“Arabs speak as one in their refusal of the partition and the [Jewish] national home,” alluding to
the partition plan set forth by a British commission that would have divided Palestine into a
Jewish state and an Arab one.93 Falastin publicly supported the rebellion even while its chief
editor harbored private reservations. The risks of being seen as a collaborator with the British
were high enough to impact al-‘Issa’s representation of the Revolt.
While al-‘Issa formulated his legacy in his memoir, British and Zionist representations of
the Revolt emerged as the dominant narrative about the failed rebellion. While this discourse
contained wildly disparate elements, certain themes emerged that would have a huge impact on
how Israeli, European, and Amerian audiences understood the rebellion. These themes will be
explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
“Criminal Disturbances:” British and Zionist Condemnation of the Revolt
In his 1936 memoir, Douglass Duff, the former British police inspector in Palestine
known for his brutal methods, recalled several exchanges with senior Arab government officials.
In one exchange, he suggested that it was “the riff-raff who are making the trouble,”
demonstrating his belief that a small group of Arab Palestinian agitators were responsible for
rising tensions.94 In another conversation, Duff wondered whether the Mandatory government
would start “concentration camps for you people, and Black-and-Tan methods for the
population.”95 These intimations recalled the ruthless attacks on civilians by British soldiers
during the Irish War of Independence. Duff openly admitted to using similar tactics as police
chief in Palestine in the 1920s. While Mandatory officials distanced themselves from Duff’s
comments, his statements reflected a need on the part of the British government to both contain
and discredit a newly burgeoning rebellion in 1936.
The Mandatory government criminalized the Revolt in its discourse. Matthew Kelly
asserts that “both the British and the Zionist leadership in 1936-1939 characterized the rebel
movement not primarily as a national, but rather as a criminal enterprise.”96 These
characterizations led to terms like “armed gangs” and “disturbances” being used to describe the
rebels and their actions. The arrests of Arab Higher Committee members as well as clergymen,
students, and farmers in 1937 reflected British officials’ desire to quell what it deemed a series of
violent, criminal acts. British security forces accompanied these detentions with raids that began
in early 1936 and targeted the homes of peasants.97 Swedenburg suggests that the British
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perceived the Revolt as a lower class instigated movement, rather than an upper class instigated
one.
Zionist leaders inaccurately portrayed the Revolt as instigated by the upper classes but
agreed with the British that it was a criminal enterprise. One Zionist newspaper, Davar leYeladim, differed from the British argument of a lower class movement. It asserted that the
Palestinian political leadership had organized the “gangs of robbers – most of whom were
criminals – murders and bandits who had fled from their own countries to escape the arm of the
law.”98 While this characterization grossly exaggerated the criminal backgrounds of rebels, it
differed from British portrayals of a poor people’s movement. It characterized the rebels as
chaotic actors who were being manipulated by wealthy political and religious leaders.99
Whatever the origins of the rebellion, Zionist publications like Davar and The Palestine Post
urged British Mandate leaders to take more forceful action against the rebels. The British
military offensive of 1938 proved too much for a fracturing rebel movement, and Palestinian
unity lay in disarray by 1939.
British and Zionist representations of the Revolt began early and responded to each of the
two groups’ interests. British officials and newspapers used the term “armed gangs” to describe
Palestinian rebels because they saw these people as criminals who were endangering law and
order in Palestine. In the minds of British officials, the Mandatory government had legitimate
authority over Palestine, and criminals had to be punished accordingly. Zionist journalists and
political leaders had a similar reaction to the rebels but also highlighted violence committed
against Jews in order to elicit international sympathy for the Zionist cause. The tendency among
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Zionist newspapers to assign blame for the Revolt’s organization on upper class notables
revealed an underestimation of the capabilities of lower class rebels. The Revolt’s defeat allowed
the discourse of criminality to become the hegemonic narrative reaching English-speaking
audiences about the rebellion.
Determined to quell a rising number of “disturbances,” British security forces undertook
a brutal campaign against Arab Palestinians in early 1936. Tensions were running high on April
20, 1936 in Jaffa and Tel Aviv after a false rumor about Jews killing two or more Arabs left
fourteen Jews and two Arabs dead. In late April, the national strike and boycott against British
and Jewish goods began and quickly spread across Arab Palestinian towns and villages. While
the strike was largely nonviolent, the Mandatory government worried that the Palestinians’
newfound unity would lead to a wider armed revolt. This fear drove a rising number of searches
and seizures by police forces.100 Referencing the violent methods practiced by Duff in the 1920s,
the Anglican archdeacon in Jerusalem wrote the colonial chief secretary a concerned letter on
June 2: “It is believed amongst some at any rate of the British Police that they have been
definitely ordered to ‘Duff them [the Arabs] up.”101 This concern over British police methods
was not only shared by Christian missionaries. Upon visiting Jerusalem on May 12-14, Duff
himself remarked on the violence to which civilians were subjected by police officers in one
search. “I saw one Arab being savagely kicked by a brawny man in khaki, whilst an old man
with a grey beard received a nasty cut from a leather hand-whip,” described Duff, demonstrating
the brutality of the inspection.102 This admission by a former inspector known for his use of
torture revealed the renewed use of aggressive tactics by security forces.
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The police searches extended beyond major towns and into the countryside as well. Kelly
argues that raids in villages occurred in April and May with the purpose of terrorizing villagers
into submission. He quotes a War Office report disclosing that raids “took the form of searches
for arms and wanted men by troops and police and, being fairly severe in nature, had also a
punitive effect which began to produce most satisfactory results in the more truculent
villages.”103 The War Office deemed the searches “severe” enough that previously belligerent
villages began to be placated. Kelly goes on to cite Kenneth Williams, a prominent journalist of
the time, as informing the new colonial secretary of “excesses” against Arab Palestinians.
Williams’ sources “were under the impression that the conduct of the troops had the approval of
the High Commissioner.”104 Based on these findings, Kelly asserts that the colonial government
used these raids as an excuse to indiscriminately punish villagers. While the exact intentions of
colonial officials who ordered these raids are unclear, the Mandatory government allowed a
permissive atmosphere to permeate police actions of the time period.
High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope supplemented these police actions with
demolitions in Jaffa that he hoped would stymie “lawless” rebels. In a confidential dispatch to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated July 6, 1936, he describes the decision-making
process leading to the demolition of several buildings in late June. Because of Jaffa’s importance
as a port city, the Mandatory government viewed Palestinian uprisings there as inimical to its
economic and political control over the coast. Disturbances became criminal actions that had to
be crushed. “The most lawless elements in Jaffa dwell in the Old City, where they have hitherto
been able successfully to defy the police and to resist any attempt to establish effective control,”
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wrote Wauchope in his July telegram.105 He pointed to the crowdedness of the Old City as a
reason for the rebels’ successful evasion of British security forces. While making a fleeting
reference to the Arab quarter’s congested conditions, Wauchope readily admitted that the
primary purpose of the building demolitions was to scatter armed resistance to British rule. In
order to make the demolitions appealing to authorities in London, he painted a portrait of violent
rebels endangering law and order in Palestine. British patrols outside the Old City “were
constantly being bombed or sniped and the Central Police Barracks were under constant fire
from houses in the Old City. In short the old town of Jaffa became a rebel stronghold, which
continued to defy the forces of law and order with impunity,” the High Commissioner explained,
revealing the dangers posed by armed Palestinian rebels.106 In Wauchope’s eyes, armed rebels
represented a threat to a Mandatory government that was the only hope for social order in
Palestine.
The process under which the building demolitions were carried out showcased divisions
among colonial officials over how best to placate Palestinians. Wauchope’s purpose in sending
his confidential telegram to the chief colonial secretary was to defend his methods from criticism
by Sir Michael McDonnell, the Chief Justice in Palestine. The two men both agreed that the
demolitions should have taken place but differed in how Palestinians should have been notified.
Fearing that an admission of the demolitions’ military nature would further stoke Palestinians
into armed revolt, Wauchope tried to allay suspicions by stressing the “administrative” reasons
behind the destruction of the buildings. In the communiqué and warnings issued to residents of
the Old City, he sought to “allay apprehensions by stressing, without any sacrifice of the truth,
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the administrative rather than military aspect of the operation, the normal rather than the
abnormal.”107 Wauchope’s definition of the “truth” is questionable here because it rests on the
assumption that there was another reason behind the demolitions other than crushing resistance
to the presence of British troops in Jaffa. Chief Justice McDonnell picked up on the insincerity in
Wauchope’s communications with Palestinians, noting “the singularly disingenuous lack of
moral courage” and “glaring case of evasiveness” evidenced by the High Commissioner’s
communiqués.108 While McDonnell may have critiqued Wauchope’s methods, both men agreed
that Palestinian resistance deserved a strong military response.
Falastin’s late June coverage stressed the overwhelming British military presence that
accompanied the building demolitions in Jaffa. In its June 19 issue, the newspaper worked hard
to illustrate the nonviolent characteristics of the national strike that was occurring at the same
time as the demolitions. “The sixtieth day [of the strike] in Jaffa came closest to resembling what
is pictured in Genesis. Warehouses and stores were closed, and the streets were empty and
free…Jaffa’s port was still, and there was a spirit of faith above it all,” read a front-page
article.109 Falastin’s editors hoped to showcase the unity of Arab Palestinians who were resisting
British colonial rule. It juxtaposed this article with one that revealed the large number of British
military reinforcements brought in to supervise the demolitions. A “number of British soldiers
came with [the commanders] with four machine guns, and two big cars filled with containers of
dynamite…the British police and the armed soldiers went to the Old City to inspect and threw
two pieces of dynamite as a warning of the beginning of the destruction,” explained the second
article.110 The demolitions were a sizeable operation that included many British soldiers. While
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the newspaper was concerned with the facts of the demolitions, it also portrayed the disruptions
to daily life posed by British military actions. In its quest to build new roads and ports, the
Mandatory government “put in front of the big mosque a number of barriers…and they put
barriers to the entrances of one street that leads to the port…and left at the entrance of each small
port an inspection point [at which they required] a very thorough inspection by soldiers and some
members of the British police.”111 Falastin’s editors subtly contested the beneficial impact of
these military operations in their coverage. British measures amounted to a policy of
containment as colonial officials sought greater control over Palestine.
The Palestine Post’s reporting reflected a desire to maintain the powerful British
government’s support for political Zionism. The Post emerged as one of the most widely-read
newspapers in Palestine and meticulously reported on events in the Middle East and Europe. Yet
its interests were also intimately tied to realizing the promises of the Balfour Declaration of
1917. While reporting on the activities of the Royal Commission in January 1937, the newspaper
asserted that Lord Peel, the lead commissioner, had stated that “the drafters of the Mandate
intended a Jewish National Home in Palestine and therefore did not trouble specifically to
provide that the Arabs should remain a majority.”112 The Post suggested that Lord Peel
understood the Mandate as supporting a Jewish and not necessarily binational state in Palestine.
The newspaper consciously characterized Peel as sympathetic to the Zionist cause in order to
demonstrate the achievability of a specifically Jewish state. Because of its interests in seeing this
nation realized, it took pains to highlight violence committed against Jews and minimize
violence by Jews against Arab Palestinians. In its January 18, 1938 issue, the newspaper
described an armed skirmish between Jewish truck drivers and Palestinians: “Four Jewish truck
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drivers of the ‘Hovala’ Company, who were part of a Palestine Potash convoy between
Jerusalem and the Dead Sea, engaged an armed gang which attacked them at kilometer 10 east,
shortly before 6 o’clock yesterday morning.”113 The terminology of “armed gang” matters. At a
time when the Revolt was gaining strength, The Palestine Post criminalized rebels in a way that
aligned with British criminological discourse. The newspaper’s language sought to demonstrate
moral superiority over Arab Palestinians at a time when a Jewish state seemed possible.
The Egyptian Gazette contributed reporting that portrayed rebellious Palestinians as
unreasonable actors. Owned by British businessmen and operating out of Cairo, the newspaper
relied heavily on Mandatory sources as well as coverage from The Palestine Post. While
informative, its articles tended be favorable toward British and Zionist interests and heavily
critical of the Palestinian national movement. The editors often copied verbatim from The
Palestine Post reports of violence that claimed Jews as victims. In its January 1, 1937 issue, the
Gazette published a report from the Post saying that a “Jewish bus passenger died in the fifth
highway attack on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road in ten days.”114 These reports were usually true and
highlighted the violence that sometimes targeted Jews. Yet The Egyptian Gazette neglected to
provide corresponding accounts of Jewish violence against Arab Palestinians. It did not cover the
moment in mid-October 1936 when two Jewish men on bicycles rode up to a taxi in Tel Aviv
and “fired three shots through the windows, wounding two of the four Arabs sitting inside” then
left leaflets declaring that “‘No Arabs shall be seen in the streets of Tel Aviv,’” as described by
Matthew Kelly.115 Both sides were guilty of cold-blooded acts of violence. In addition to skewed
depictions of events on the ground, the newspaper exaggerated the divisions within the
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Palestinian political leadership. The January 7, 1937 issue of the Gazette reported that tensions
on the Arab Higher Committee were near a breaking-point as Hajj Amin butted heads with a
large number of committee members who favored testifying before the British Royal
Commission that had arrived to assess the deteriorating situation in Palestine. This
characterization probably overemphasized friction within the Arab Higher Committee, which
required the intervention of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah of Transjordan
before finally appearing before the Commission.116 It also obscured the strong support that Hajj
Amin still held in the countryside. The Egyptian Gazette’s representation of unreasonable
Palestinians compounded a discourse of criminality that attempted to delegitimize the rebellion.
Zionist journalists differed from the British in their characterization of the origins of the
Revolt. While certainly frustrated with Arab Higher Committee members, Mandatory officials
usually agreed that lower class Palestinians were responsible for the burgeoning rebellion.
Zionist publications were skeptical about the organizational capabilities of the lower classes and
argued that the rebellion was facilitated by Arab elites and inattentive British officials. Even the
British chief secretary in Palestine, Sir John Hathorn Hall, complained in March 1937 that the
typically moderate Haaretz had implied “that Government [was] supporting murderers and
agitators” and that “British and Arab officials [were] supporting rebellious people.”117 Hall was
incredulous that Haaretz would accuse the Mandatory government of collaborating with
Palestinians at a time when British and Zionist goals were so closely intertwined. His ensuing
suspension of Haaretz showcased the tensions between a colonial government and a Zionist
publication that viewed the Arab rebellion as a direct threat to the Jewish community in
Palestine.
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Zionist authorities tended to assign blame on Hajj Amin and then on external actors for
the rebellion’s continuation. Paralleling The Egyptian Gazette, The Palestine Post described Hajj
Amin as the stubborn holdout who refused to cooperate with the British Royal Commission until
the intervention of more reasonable actors. The newspaper eagerly reported on the problems
caused by Hajj Amin’s position: “The failure to arrive at a definite decision by the Higher
Committee has caused despondency in Arab political circles and some Arabs have already
decided to appear before the Royal Commission which, without the approval of the Higher
Committee, considerably undermines that body’s prestige.”118 The Post pointed to disagreements
between Hajj Amin and other members as evidence that the whole Committee was
disintegrating. While certain Palestinians, including Nashashîbî family members, wanted to
appear before the Royal Commission, many Arabs felt that cooperating with the commission
only played into the Mandate’s hands. The Post created a false impression that noncooperation
was an unreasonable, extreme position. Ted Swedenburg argues that after Hajj Amin’s escape to
Lebanon in late 1937, Zionist leaders portrayed the Revolt as influenced by external actors.
According to them, outside figures used criminal proxies to unleash an “unprecedented campaign
of terror and violence” that intimidated Arab Palestinians into prolonging the rebellion.119 This
explanation aligns with publications like Haaretz and The Palestine Post that portrayed
influential elites as stirring up the passions of lower class criminals. These characterizations
would continue to influence the discourse after the Revolt’s defeat.
After defeating the rebellion militarily, Britain used the White Paper of 1939 to give
concessions to the Palestinians that the Mandatory government hoped would limit future unrest.
As British troops unleashed a counteroffensive in late 1938, Palestinian unity collapsed and left
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the rural rebels in disarray. Despite the government’s military victory, the May 1939 release of
the White Paper reflected the British realization that Arab resistance to Zionism and the Mandate
was strong. Hoping to placate Arab Palestinians as World War II broke out, it announced plans
for an independent Palestine within ten years. “The independent State should be one in which
Arabs and Jews share government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each
community are safeguarded,” announced His Majesty’s Government, thereby abandoning its
earlier devotion to the creation of an exclusively Jewish state.120 Recognizing Arab political
rights, it advocated for a binational state in which Jews and Arabs would share governance. It
highlighted a thriving Jewish economy and the presence of political and educational
organizations as evidence that the Jewish national home was already well established in
Palestine. The White Paper decided that for “each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish
immigrants will be allowed” with accommodation for 25,000 additional refugees, in a nod to
heightened persecution of Jews in Europe.121 The British government hoped that the continuance
of some Jewish immigration would mollify opposition from Zionists.
Despite British hopes, the White Paper proved unpopular to those affected on the ground.
It incensed the Zionist community, which viewed the increasing persecution of Jews in Nazi
Germany as an existential threat. Determined to reclaim Palestine as a safe haven for Jews,
Zionist leaders rejected the White Paper and adopted an increasingly aggressive position against
both the British and Arab Palestinians. The document was not popular with Palestinians either.
Its ambiguity regarding the continuation of land sales and the political structures of the future
Palestinian state worried many residents who had seen the British government renege on
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promises made before. Nevertheless, most Arab political leaders were inclined to accept the
document until the intervention of Hajj Amin. Hajj Amin’s protestations eventually secured a
rejection of the White Paper from the Arab Higher Committee.122 While ignored by Zionists and
Palestinians, the White Paper emerged as Britain’s de facto policy in Palestine for the duration of
WWII.
The rebellion’s failure paved the way for British and Zionist characterizations to emerge
as the dominant discourse surrounding the rebellion. The Mandatory government’s renewed hold
on Palestine ensured that academics favorable to Zionism and highly critical of Arab Palestinian
actors would rise to prominence. Hajj Amin’s visit to Nazi Germany on the eve of WWII did not
help matters. By taking refuge in a place where he would be free from British capture, the
political leader of the rebellion unknowingly delegitimized the Revolt in the eyes of the
international community. Zionist leaders could tarnish the Revolt by linking its public face to the
horrors of the Holocaust. Yad Vashem, the Holocaust national museum in Jerusalem, portrays
Hajj Amin only as a Nazi collaborator, thereby implicating the entire Palestinian people in
Nazism.123 Until recently, Israeli historiography tended to portray Hajj Amin as a man on the
edge of extremism and rebels as criminal, violent actors. “Extreme groups, particularly the
younger militant organisations, were pressuring him to step-up the struggle,” wrote Zvi Elpeleg
about the pressures facing Hajj Amin in 1936.124 These terms reflect the consensus that rebels
were radical, violent agents as opposed to participants in a national struggle. Monty Noam
Penkower evinced a similar view in his description of the “renewed wave of Arab terrorism” that
was occurring in Palestine in 1938.125 While such perceptions were not shared by Arab
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Palestinians, they contributed to English-speaking audiences’ understanding of the Revolt.
Contested representations are still being grappled with in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict today.
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Conclusion
How do we make sense of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in the context of the current
Israeli-Palestinian conflict? As historians grapple with the 1930s rebellion, news headlines
demonstrate the immediacy of today’s conflict. “A soldier serving in reserve duty was lightly
wounded Tuesday morning in a stabbing attack at the Gush Etzion Junction in the West Bank.
The Palestinian assailant was shot and killed at the scene,” reported Gili Cohen and Jack Khoury
in Haaretz on January 5, 2016.126 Acts of violence in the West Bank continue to ripple across the
international consciousness, only now with the speed and efficiency that global media and
communications provide. Conflicts in the area are contributing to how political leaders across the
Middle East shape policy. Historians should be careful to draw hasty conclusions about events
today based on a rebellion that occurred eighty years ago. Such behavior would prove a
disservice to the general public. But an informed and holistic understanding of the Revolt of 3639 can provide an entryway into a historiography that still resonates today.
The term “contested representations” almost obscures the animosity of feeling on all
sides at the end of the Revolt. While many fallâhîn were reeling from devastating losses by the
British, they were directing much of their frustration at upper class notables and other betrayers
of the national cause. Upper class figures like the Nashashîbîs were struggling to explain their
infidelity to a rebellion that had proved beyond their control while at the same time working to
ensure that they would remain in the good graces of the Mandatory government. Mandatory
officials were taken aback by the ferocity of the rebellion and tried to craft new policy that would
placate both Palestinians and Zionists. Zionist leaders united in their denunciation of the armed
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rebellion and pressured the British to hasten the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Contested
representations of the conflict shaped how actors in Palestine pursued future national goals.
The subsequent perpetration of the Holocaust lent international legitimacy to the
necessity for a Jewish national home. The actions of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis left millions of
Jews dead and devastated the remaining Jewish community in Europe. While Hitler’s
persecution of Jews was certainly known during WWII, the true extent of Auschwitz and other
concentration camps was only unearthed and publicized after the war’s conclusion. While
representing a culmination of anti-Semitism in Nazi-controlled Europe, the Holocaust also forced
global leaders to acknowledge unfounded animosity toward Jews in many of their own countries.
International sympathy rose in nations that until now had been reluctant to take in more Jewish
refugees, and Jewish self-determination became a pressing political issue. Zionism became
increasingly appealing to a religious community that seemed to experience discrimination in
whatever country it found itself in. Zionists advocated for a return to an ancestral homeland that
offered economic opportunity and fraternity. American officials joined the call for the
establishment of a national home for the Jews. Pressure rose on Britain from both Zionist leaders
and a newly sympathetic United States to hasten the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 had as an unintended consequence the
relegation of Palestinian discourse to the periphery. While Arab Palestinian perspectives were
never treated as the dominant voice in Mandatory Palestine, they strongly opposed Britain’s
sponsorship of the Zionist movement. This sponsorship began with the Balfour Declaration of
1917 and continued with the facilitation of Jewish immigration and the favorable subsidies that
the Mandatory government provided the Zionist community in Palestine. Palestinians objected to
the preferential treatment afforded Zionists and the deterioration of their livelihoods that came
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with rapid land sales. The national movement displayed surprising moments of strength, as
evidenced by the Revolt of 1936-39 and the alarmed reaction to it by the British colonial
government. Yet while providing self-determination for one group of people, Israeli
independence ironically relegated another group to the background. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War,
which caused the deaths of thousands, created the Palestinian refugee problem. In addition to
losing their livelihoods and ancestral homeland, these Palestinians also lost claim to a discourse
that increasingly branded them as outsiders and radical actors. The emergence of prominent
academics who fiercely defended Zionism would prove the inferiority with which Palestinians
were treated in the historical domain.
Historians like Zvi Elpeleg and Monty Poam Penkower represent a discourse of defensive
Zionism. While accomplished historians, these scholars too often label Arab Palestinian actors in
the 1930s as “extremists.” Their interest in Palestinian decision-making only extends to the point
that it proves the legitimacy of Zionism. Elpeleg dismisses the violence of 1937-1939 as an
example of Arab “terrorism.” He describes the “horrifying means” of violence practiced by the
rebels and contrasts them with havlagah, the policy of restraint practiced by Labor Zionists of
the period, which he designates as “one of the extraordinary manifestations of Jewish spirit to be
seen in Palestine.”127 Elpeleg’s decision to contrast Arab violence with the restraint of certain
Zionists diminishes a rebellion that was united until 1938 against the structural violence of the
British Mandate. Penkower’s analysis of the violence surrounding Hajj Amin’s escape to
Lebanon in 1937 demonstrates similarly troubling language. He describes violence committed by
Palestinians as a “sudden outbreak of Arab terrorism between October 14 and 16, designed to
distract the British police while [Hajj Amin] made good his flight.”128 Penkower does not
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mention whom the violence targeted. Was this violence “terrorism?” Or did it respond to a
structurally violent Mandate that put police patrols in cities and villages and disrupted the daily
life of Palestinian residents? Language is everything, and the historiography practiced by Elpeleg
and Penkower tends to simplify an armed revolt that most Arab Palestinians felt was justified.
This simplification is driven by the desire to position Zionism as the more reasonable movement
of the period.
Edward Said paved the way for a new understanding of anti-colonial struggles in the
Middle East. Said’s 1978 book Orientalism argued that Western interpretations of the Middle
East and Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries were rooted in assumptions of cultural superiority.
Economic and political considerations drove imperialism, but European leaders justified their
endeavors by highlighting the need to “civilize” an exotic East. This superiority complex
manifested itself in the way in which British colonialists disregarded the wishes of Palestinians.
Said incorporates Zionism into the colonial framework, arguing that “Zionism came fully into its
own by actively destroying as many Arab traces as it could.”129 An erasure of Arab Palestinian
history accompanied a Zionist takeover of public space in Palestine. Said connects the Zionist
project with a British colonial legacy.
While Zionism certainly earned the hostility of many Arab Palestinians, I argue that the
rebellion of 1936-39 was directed primarily against the British Mandatory government. Arabs
targeted Jews in several instances but mostly focused their attacks on British soldiers and
facilities. Matthew Kelly demonstrates the tendency of British officials to ignore the structural
violence that was driving these attacks. “The tendency to gloss over the role of British violence
in begetting Arab violence…is not restricted to 1936. Just as the British underplayed the
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importance of their use of force in determining the early trajectory of the rebellion in Palestine,
so too did they overlook its fundamental role in shaping events in the Mandate in the period after
1936,” he writes, describing the way in which British archival documents downplayed the use of
force employed by police patrols in the 1930s.130 This technique led to the criminological
discourse that emphasized the criminal rather than national characteristics of the rebellion.
Rashid Khalidi demonstrates how lower class Palestinians pushed their leaders to take a more
confrontational stance against the Mandate. When “radical change in the course of Palestinian
political opposition to the British and to Zionism was firmly blocked by the determined
resistance of the traditional notable leaders…frustrated popular discontent had to find another
avenue of expression.” Khalidi points to the failed uprising of Shaykh al-Qassâm, the prolonged
general strike and boycott, and the massive Revolt as evidence of this grassroots frustration.131
The emphasis on lower class organization matters because it recognizes the groundwork done by
rebels who are often marginalized in the historical discourse.
Dr. Sharif Elmusa’s reflections on the Revolt confirmed the popular uprising described
by scholars like Kelly and Khalidi. Dr. Elmusa, who grew up in Palestine, is a professor of
Political Science at the American University in Cairo and a former research fellow at the
Institute for Palestine Studies in Washington, D.C. In my interview with him, Elmusa remarked
on the Revolt’s importance to Palestinians. “People always talked about it; it became like the
U.S. 60s. People always remembered it. My father and uncles probably participated.”132 Elmusa
revealed his relatives’ personal involvement with a rebellion that loomed large in the collective
memory of Palestinians. Palestinians thought of 1936-39 as a defining moment in the formation
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of their national consciousness. Elmusa agreed with Khalidi and Ted Swedenburg in his
interpretation of the origins of the Revolt. “[Hajj Amin] al-Husaynî may overall have guided the
Revolt from the outside, but the day-to-day [fighting was done] by Palestinians. Al-Husaynî was
pushed into leading the Revolt by the lower classes.”133 Elmusa’s explanation further confirms
evidence of a rebellion driven by the lower classes and fallâhîn. While urban notables may have
supported the Revolt through financial and political means, they had no intention of risking their
Mandatory privileges by actively fighting in it. These realities complicate Elmusa’s assertion that
the Revolt was the “first time the country came together and acted as a country.”134 Palestinian
unity extended across the lower classes opposed to British colonial rule, at least until mid-1938.
However, the hesitance of many upper class residents to abandon class privileges hinted at the
disarray that would arrive by 1939.
Elmusa highlighted the power of the British and their close relationship with Zionism as
factors leading to the Revolt’s defeat. While acknowledging the tensions among different
Palestinians, Elmusa stressed British military superiority as the primary reason behind the
Revolt’s failure:
Elmusa: It’s hard to say why things failed. You can argue whatever, but you’re
always facing a big power, the British, with 20,000 troops. First reason is you had
the Nashashîbîs making deals with the British and even with the Zionists. No
doubt elite were part of it, with the Sursouk family… [the Palestinians] didn’t
have military sophistication or the numbers; that led to the deterioration of it. But
the British were the prime reason; the military plus the government controlled
everything.135
Elmusa attributes the Revolt’s failure to several reasons but maintains that British military power
superseded factionalism among Palestinians. Elmusa expressed hope that English-speaking
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audiences would understand the close relationship between British colonialism and Zionism in
Mandatory Palestine. He stressed that the Zionist position increased with the decimation of the
rebels. “Palestinians were exhausted by 1939, and the Zionists could come out on top…The
long-term plan was to build a Zionist state and force the Palestinians out.”136 Elmusa’s claim of
Zionist gains references the economic growth that Zionists experienced when demand for their
goods increased due to the interruption of Arab labor during the Revolt. Elmusa also implied that
the British government never intended to create an independent Palestine and had a “long-term
plan” to create a Zionist state that did not include Palestinians. He sought to demonstrate how
Zionist leaders enjoyed a more advantageous relationship with the Mandatory government than
did Arab authorities.
Sherene Seikaly’s focus on unequal economic relationships in the Mandate strengthens
the recent historiography put forth by Elmusa, Swedenburg, Kelly, and others. Her economic
history highlights the aspirations and activities of a rising group of Arab capitalists, a sector of
society that is often overlooked in traditional historical narratives of the period. This emerging
middle class of bankers, merchants, and businessmen had their own representations of 1930s
Palestine and what it could be. While acknowledging the Zionist land settlement and
expropriation that displaced fallâhîn, she asks questions that move away from the dichotomous
Zionist-Palestinian conflict. “What I seek to destabilize here is not whether Palestinians were
sufficiently national, but to ask why that sufficiency and/or its lack continues to be the measuring
stick for whether people can remain on the land they resided on for centuries. Must people’s
investment in the random and shifting borders that imperial and colonial officials drew determine
their status?” she asks, displaying an exasperation with the idea that Palestinians needed to be
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sufficiently national in order to stay on their land.137 She focuses on the economic, everyday
interactions that governed Palestinians’ lives as opposed to the overtly political ones. These
interactions were not limited to one demographic and included examples of economic
cooperation between Jews and Arabs. But Arab Palestinian economic aspirations were stifled by
the British Mandate, whereas Zionist ones were not.
Historiography that illustrates the structural violence within the Mandate and the varied
responses to it by Palestinians challenges the hegemonic narrative enforced by British and
Zionist authorities after the Revolt’s defeat. The prominence of Zionist historians’ works in the
U.S. and Europe in the mid-to-late 20th century meant that American and British audiences
usually heard a one-sided interpretation of the Revolt. This interpretation tended to treat
Palestinian rebels as extremists in order to justify the actions of the British and Zionists in
harshly repressing the rebellion. The recent increase in Palestinian scholars at British and
American universities as well as younger Western historians interested in revisiting the conflict
has allowed a more holistic historiography to develop. Certain Israeli historians like Ilan Pappe
have made important contributions to this new historiography. My thesis aligns with these recent
narratives by demonstrating that Palestinian actions during the Revolt were more diverse and
calculated than as portrayed by British and Zionist representations.
These representations continue to influence the conflict today. The article by Cohen and
Khoury in Haaretz reveals the deplorable acts of violence from certain Palestinians that endanger
Israeli lives in the West Bank. Yet coverage that stresses Palestinian violence without examining
the conditions that perpetuate it simplifies the conflict and makes it harder to solve.
Representations that ignore overreach by the Israeli military and the suffering of Palestinians in
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the occupied territories only serve to inflame tensions. Another article in Haaretz by Asher
Schechter offers a more balanced interpretation in his discussion of the recent 2014 war in Gaza.
While acknowledging Israel’s right to defend itself, Schechter reports that over 60 percent of
those killed by 247 Israeli airstrikes were children, women and older men. He concludes that the
“large number of civilian casualties, the magnitude of the damage, and the testimonies of IDF
veterans point to a policy that made too little an effort to discriminate between combatants and
civilians.”138 This permissive policy caused the deaths of innocent lives and contributed to the
destruction of an area of land that has been described as the world’s largest refugee camp.
Schechter’s willingness to question his government’s actions offers hope that more holistic
interpretations of the conflict can develop in Israel. Challenging simplistic representations will
be necessary in order to bring an end to the conflict today.
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